Supreme Court Case

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (1984)

467 U.S. 837 (1984)

John Paul Stevens, III, three-quarters portrait holding book and wearing judicial robes, seated in front of bookcase and United States flag, by Robert S. Oakes, photographer.
Justice John Paul Stevens
Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division
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“[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”

Selected by

Caroline Fredrickson

Visiting Professor, Georgetown University Law Center and Senior Fellow at the Brennan Center for Justice

Ilan Wurman

Associate Professor, Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law at Arizona State University

Summary

When there was a challenge to the Environmental Protection Agency’s interpretation of the word “source” in a law regulating air pollution, the Supreme Court considered whether silence (or ambiguity) in a statute means that a reviewing court can freely impose its own interpretation. An affirmative response here would mean that courts, as the judicial branch, could overrule agency interpretations of the statutes they administer as the executive branch. The Court held that the courts must defer to a reasonable agency interpretation of a statute if the statutory language is unclear or ambiguous. Scholars and lawyers refer to this approach as “Chevron deference.” This opinion essentially built a hierarchy of construction: Congress’s explicit intent reigns supreme, and agencies’ reasonable interpretations of any gaps follow. It somewhat limited courts’ power to overrule agencies in this field, thereby arguably preserving the separation of powers as well.

Read the Full Opinion

Excerpt: Majority Opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens

When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.

“The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created . . .  program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.” If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.

Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on the basis of the judges’ personal policy preferences. In contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices—resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.

When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case, federal judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do. The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones: “Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches.”


 
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